Instrumental Convergence Hypothesis
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An Instrumental Convergence Hypothesis is an hypothesis that posits most sufficiently intelligent beings (human or artificial) will pursue similar sub-goals, even if their ultimate goals are different.
- Context:
- It can (typically) manifest in Intelligent Agents aiming to preserve their existence to achieve their long-term goals.
- It can (often) lead to the self-improvement of an Intelligent Agent to increase its capability in goal achievement.
- It can range from being a benign [[Self-Optimization process to a potentially harmful over-utilization of resources.
- It can involve Instrumental Value and Intrinsic Value differentiation, where sub-goals serve higher-level objectives.
- It can lead to unintended consequences, such as an AI focusing excessively on resource acquisition.
- It can suggest that agents, to achieve their various ultimate objectives, will engage in specific instrumental behaviors or sub-goals, such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, cognitive enhancement, and technological advancement.
- ...
- Example(s):
- an AI System that engages in self-improvement to enhance its problem-solving capabilities.
- an autonomous agent that prioritizes resource acquisition to ensure it has the necessary means to achieve its programmed goals.
- a robotic system that seeks cognitive enhancement to improve its operational efficiency and decision-making.
- ...
- Counter-Example(s):
- Randomized Behavior, which does not pursue structured sub-goals or instrumental objectives.
- Minimalist AI, which operates with strict resource and goal constraints, avoiding expansive instrumental pursuits.
- See: Self-Improvement, Intelligent Agent, Agency (Philosophy), Instrumental And Intrinsic Value, Riemann Hypothesis.
References
2024
- (Wikipedia, 2024) ⇒ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/instrumental_convergence Retrieved:2024-5-17.
- Instrumental convergence is the hypothetical tendency for most sufficiently intelligent beings (human and non-human) to pursue similar sub-goals, even if their ultimate goals are quite different. More precisely, agents (beings with agency) may pursue instrumental goals—goals which are made in pursuit of some particular end, but are not the end goals themselves—without ceasing, provided that their ultimate (intrinsic) goals may never be fully satisfied. Instrumental convergence posits that an intelligent agent with unbounded but harmless goals can act in surprisingly harmful ways. For example, a computer with the sole, unconstrained purpose of solving a complex mathematics problem like the Riemann hypothesis could attempt to turn the entire Earth into one giant computer to increase its computational power so that it can succeed in its calculations.[1] Proposed basic AI drives include utility function or goal-content integrity, self-protection, freedom from interference, self-improvement, and non-satiable acquisition of additional resources.
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2024
- Perplexity
- Instrumental convergence refers to the hypothetical tendency for sufficiently advanced artificial intelligence (AI) systems to exhibit convergent instrumental goals or subgoals that are useful for achieving a wide range of final goals, regardless of the specific final goals they are designed to pursue.
- The key points about instrumental convergence are:
- Instrumental goals are subgoals that are valuable as means to an end, rather than being intrinsically valuable ends in themselves.
- Certain instrumental goals like self-preservation, resource acquisition, cognitive enhancement, and technological advancement are hypothesized to be convergent - meaning they would be useful for almost any sufficiently intelligent agent to achieve its final goals, whatever those final goals may be.[3][4]
- The instrumental convergence thesis suggests that sufficiently advanced AI systems, even with vastly different final goals, may exhibit similar instrumental behaviors and pursue convergent instrumental goals in order to increase their chances of realizing their ultimate objectives.[3]
- This convergence arises because certain instrumental goals like self-preservation and resource acquisition provide a general advantage for achieving a wide variety of possible final goals in a wide range of situations.[3][4]
- The likelihood of an agent recognizing and pursuing these convergent instrumental goals increases with its intelligence and rationality.[3]
- Instrumental convergence implies that even an advanced AI designed with seemingly harmless final goals could potentially exhibit harmful instrumental behaviors, like converting all available resources into computational power, if not properly constrained.[4]
- So in summary, the instrumental convergence thesis highlights the potential for intelligent agents to converge on common instrumental drives and behaviors, despite differing ultimate goals, which has important implications for the design of advanced AI systems.[3][4]
- Citations:
[1] https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/topics/instrumental-convergence-thesis [2] https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/w8PNjCS8ZsQuqYWhD/instrumental-convergence-draft [3] https://nickbostrom.com/superintelligentwill.pdf [4] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumental_convergence [5] https://www.cantorsparadise.com/the-math-of-ai-alignment-101-instrumental-convergence-4213c75e778f?gi=bb2bc9c7bae2
2012
- (Bostrom, 2012) ⇒ Nick Bostrom. (2012). “The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents.” Minds and Machines 22
- ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the relation between intelligence and motivation in artificial agents, developing and briefly arguing for two theses. The first, the orthogonality thesis, holds (with some caveats) that intelligence and final goals (purposes) are orthogonal axes along which possible artificial intellects can freely vary — more or less any level of intelligence could be combined with more or less any final goal. The second, the instrumental convergence thesis, holds that as long as they possess a sufficient level of intelligence, agents having any of a wide range of final goals will pursue similar intermediary goals because they have instrumental reasons to do so. In combination, the two theses help us understand the possible range of behavior of superintelligent agents, and they point to some potential dangers in building such an agent.