Hohfeldian Analysis Method

From GM-RKB
(Redirected from Hohfeld's method)
Jump to navigation Jump to search

A Hohfeldian Analysis Method is a legal analysis method developed by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879-1918) that systematizes legal concepts such as rights and duties to clarify legal relationships and principles.



References

2024

  • (Wikipedia, 2024) ⇒ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wesley_Newcomb_Hohfeld Retrieved:2024-5-9.
    • NOTES:
      • Hohfeldian analysis identifies the precision issues in legal language, particularly around the term "right," which Hohfeld noticed was often used imprecisely by even the most respected jurists.
      • This analysis systematizes legal terms into eight distinct concepts organized into four pairs of jural opposites and correlatives, such as Right and Duty, Privilege and No-Right, Power and Disability, and Immunity and Liability, to clarify their use and interrelationships.
      • Hohfeld's method provides a structured approach to dissecting legal arguments, enhancing the clarity and consistency of legal reasoning by mapping out the matrix of legal relationships and their implications on individual liberties and duties.
      • Through Hohfeldian analysis, legal rights and duties are depicted as interrelated, ensuring that a right for one party correlates with a duty for another, which aids in understanding and applying legal principles more systematically.
      • The analysis not only aids legal professionals in understanding the legal framework but also helps in teaching complex legal concepts, as demonstrated by Hohfeld's influence on the American Law Institute's conceptualizations of property rights.

2018

  • (Hurd & Moore, 2018) ⇒ Heidi M. Hurd, and Michael S. Moore. (2018). “The Hohfeldian Analysis of Rights.” The American journal of jurisprudence 63, no. 2
    • ABSTRACT: The article both explicates and evaluates (partly defends and partly critiques) the Hohfeldian analysis of legal rights particularly insofar as that analysis is extended to embrace moral rights as well as legal rights. Hohfeld is seen as distinguishing rights to do things (liberties or privileges) from rights to have things done for or to one (claim-rights). Only the second have correlative duties, the first having as its correlative only the absence of a right that the actor not do that which he has a privilege to do. Hohfeld's analysis is seen to understate the importance of rights for moral theory in two ways: as to liberty-rights, there is no sphere of freedom of action that it is the correlative duty of others to respect; and as to claim-rights, these appear to be no more than the reflex of a more basic, correlative duty. The article seeks to reinvigorate the role of rights in moral theory first, by substituting a more robust notion of liberty rights in replacement of Hohfeld's notion, and second, by showing that his analysis of claim rights, properly understood, does not make rights the mere reflex of more basic, correlative duties.