Cooperative Game
A Cooperative Game is a game that is a cooperative task.
- Context:
- It can exhibit a Free Rider Problem.
- …
- Example(s):
- Society.
- …
- Counter-Example(s):
- See: Social Agent, Prisoner's Dilemma.
References
2014
- (Wikipedia, 2014) ⇒ http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory#Cooperative_.2F_Non-cooperative Retrieved:2014-8-6.
- A game is cooperative if the players are able to form binding commitments. For instance, the legal system requires them to adhere to their promises. In noncooperative games, this is not possible.
Often it is assumed that communication among players is allowed in cooperative games, but not in non-cooperative ones. However, this classification on two binary criteria has been questioned, and sometimes rejected.
Of the two types of games, noncooperative games are able to model situations to the finest details, producing accurate results. Cooperative games focus on the game at large. Considerable efforts have been made to link the two approaches. The so-called Nash-programme (Nash program is the research agenda for investigating on the one hand axiomatic bargaining solutions and on the other hand the equilibrium outcomes of strategic bargaining procedures)[1] has already established many of the cooperative solutions as noncooperative equilibria.
Hybrid games contain cooperative and non-cooperative elements. For instance, coalitions of players are formed in a cooperative game, but these play in a non-cooperative fashion.
- A game is cooperative if the players are able to form binding commitments. For instance, the legal system requires them to adhere to their promises. In noncooperative games, this is not possible.
- ↑ Harold Houba, Wilko Bolt. Credible Threats in Negotiations. A Game-theoretic Approach. Chapter 4. The Nash Program. ISBN 978-1-4020-7183-6.
1953
- (Nash, 1953) ⇒ John Nash. (1953). “Two-person cooperative games." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society.
- ABSTRACT: A solution is derived by two different methods for games in which the two participants have neither completely opposed nor completely coincident interests, and in which the two participants are permitted to agree on a rational course of action which is assumed enforceable. The solution centers on the concept of a threat, which is a punitive strategy to be followed if agreement is not reached. The solution is compared with the solution by von Neumann and Morgenstern of similar games.