Evaluative Judgement

Context:
- It can be represented by an Evaluative Statement.
- …
Counter-Example(s):
- an Emotional State.
See: Moral Judgment, Right (Ethics), Wrong, Usefulness, Relativism, Intrinsic Value.

References

(Wikipedia, 2015) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_judgment Retrieved:2015-10-4.
- A value judgment is a judgment of the rightness or wrongness of something or someone, or of the usefulness of something or someone, based on a comparison or other relativity. As a generalization, a value judgment can refer to a judgment based upon a particular set of values or on a particular value system. A related meaning of value judgment is an expedient evaluation based upon limited information at hand, an evaluation undertaken because a decision must be made on short notice.

(Midgley, 2000) ⇒ Gerald Midgley. (2000). “Systemic Intervention." Springer Us,
- QUOTE: … undertake a particular piece of pure, curiosity-driven research, the scientist is still making a value judgement that this is the right thing to do (rather than taking on some other research project, for instance). This kind of judgement is therefore just as amenable to moral inquiry as that made by the applied scientist — it just means acknowledging that factors other than curiosity can and should be considered in forming pure research agendas …

(Griffin, 1998) ⇒ James Griffin. (1998). “Value Judgement: Improving Our Ethical Beliefs." Oxford University Press,
- QUOTE: James Griffin asks how, and how much, we can improve our ethical standards - not lift our behaviour closer to our standards but refine the standards themselves. To give an answer to this question it is necessary to answer most of the questions of ethics. So Value Judgement includes discussion of what a good life is like, where the boundaries of the `natural world' come, how values relate to that world, how great human capacitiesthe ones important to ethicsare, and where moral norms come from. Throughout the book the question of what philosophy can contribute to ethics repeatedly arises. Philosophical traditions, such as most forms of utilitarianism and deontology and virtue ethics, are, Griffin contends, too ambitious. Ethics cannot be what philosophers in those traditions expect it to be because agents cannot be what their philosophies need them to be. This clear, compelling, and original account of ethics will be of interest to anyone concerned with thinking about values: not only philosophers but legal, political, and economic theorists as well.