Normative Property

A Normative Property is a property that can be ascribed with a normative predicate.

• Context:
  • It can be ascribed to a Moral System.
  • It can be evaluated by a Moral Judgement.
• Example(s):
  • "Choosing to save five thousand people over saving two people is good".
  • …
• Counter-Example(s):
  • a Descriptive Property (with a descriptive predicate).
• See: Consequentialism, Normative, Ethical Analysis.

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References

2008

• (Streumer, 2008) ⇒ Bart Streumer. (2008). “Are There Irreducibly Normative Properties?". In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 86(4).
  • QUOTE: To distinguish normative properties from descriptive properties, we first need to distinguish normative predicates (such as ‘is right’, ‘is good’ and ‘is a reason for’) from descriptive predicates (such as ‘is square’, ‘is yellow’ or ‘is larger than’).

     We can then say that

    (2) A descriptive property is a property that can be ascribed with a descriptive predicate,

    3) A normative property is a property that can be ascribed with a normative predicate, …

    … Necessarily, anything that has normative properties also has descriptive properties

2006

• (Gibbard, 2006) ⇒ Alan Gibbard.. “Normative Properties.” In: Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons (eds.) "Metaethics after Moore" doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269914.003.0015. *[[
  • Moore claimed that what he took to be the fundamental moral concept, goodness, is a non-natural concept. From this, together with his premise that there is a property — goodness — he inferred that the concept goodness signifies a non-natural property. This chapter distinguishes properties from concepts, and accepts that there is a difference between basic moral concepts and naturalistic concepts. However, it argues that moral concepts signify natural properties: some natural property is the property of being good. The main thesis is a so-called thesis of natural constitution: some broadly natural property constitutes being what one ought to do. The main argument for this claim begins with a traditional non-cognitivist (expressivist) theme that to understand what the word ‘ought’ means we need to say what it is to think or claim that someone ought to do something. Ought-statements are understood in terms of the activity of planning, and it is proposed that we can best grasp the content or meaning of such statements by understanding what it is to disagree in plan. The upshot of this argument is that any planner is committed to the thesis of natural constitution. The rest of the chapter paper is concerned with exploring and defending the philosophical assumptions (e.g. about the nature of properties) presupposed in this argument. The overall metaethical view of the chapter represents a blend of non-naturalism about moral concepts with naturalism about moral properties.

1972

• (Morgenstern, 1972) ⇒ Oskar Morgenstern. (1972). “Descriptive, Predictive and Normative Theory." Kyklos 25, no. 4 (1972): 699-714.
  • QUOTE: Even descriptive theories can be interpreted as “normative” provided they are convincing to the user. The implied norm is often a prohibition, as for example, in the statement that one should not try to build a perpetuum mobile. If a state of society is commonly accepted which sanctions private property, then the norm follows that one ought not to steal. This is different from normative value statements that derive solely from other norms.

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