Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
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An Evolutionarily Stable Strategy is a social game strategy that cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare.
- AKA: ESS.
- See: Nash Equilibrium, Stochastically Stable Equilibrium, Strong Nash Equilibrium, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Evolutionary Game Theory.
References
2015
- (Wikipedia, 2015) ⇒ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/evolutionarily_stable_strategy Retrieved:2015-5-17.
- An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare. It is relevant in game theory, behavioural ecology, and evolutionary psychology. An ESS is an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium. It is a Nash equilibrium that is “evolutionarily" stable: once it is fixed in a population, natural selection alone is sufficient to prevent alternative (mutant) strategies from invading successfully. The theory is not intended to deal with the possibility of gross external changes to the environment that bring new selective forces to bear.
First published as a specific term in the 1972 book by John Maynard Smith, the ESS is widely used in behavioural ecology and economics, and has been used in anthropology, evolutionary psychology, philosophy, and political science.
- An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a strategy which, if adopted by a population in a given environment, cannot be invaded by any alternative strategy that is initially rare. It is relevant in game theory, behavioural ecology, and evolutionary psychology. An ESS is an equilibrium refinement of the Nash equilibrium. It is a Nash equilibrium that is “evolutionarily" stable: once it is fixed in a population, natural selection alone is sufficient to prevent alternative (mutant) strategies from invading successfully. The theory is not intended to deal with the possibility of gross external changes to the environment that bring new selective forces to bear.