Third-Party Punishment
A Third-Party Punishment is a punishment by an Unaffected Third Party.
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- Counter-Example(s):
- See: Altruism, Norm (Social), Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Third-Party Punishment Game.
References
2016
- (Wikipedia, 2016) ⇒ http://wikipedia.org/wiki/third-party_punishment Retrieved:2016-2-25.
- Third-party punishment, also known as altruistic punishment, refers to a phenomenon in which a person or party is punished for violation of social norms by an outside observer who is not directly affected by the violation. It can be argued that third-party punishments are the essence of social norms, as they are evolutionary stable unlike second-party punishments. It has also been shown that third-party punishments are exhibited in all examined populations, though the magnitude of the punishments varies greatly, and that costly punishment co-varies with altruistic behavior. Differences between within-group and inter-group altruistic punishments have also been observed.
- (Jordan et al., 2016) ⇒ Jillian J. Jordan, Moshe Hoffman, Paul Bloom, and David G. Rand. (2016). “Third-party Punishment As a Costly Signal of Trustworthiness.” In: Nature, 530(7591). doi:10.1038/nature16981
2008
- (Buckholtz et al., 2008) ⇒ Joshua W. Buckholtz, Christopher L. Asplund, Paul E. Dux, David H. Zald, John C. Gore, Owen D. Jones, and Rene Marois. (2008). “The Neural Correlates of Third-party Punishment." Neuron 60, no. 5
2004
- (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004) ⇒ Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher. (2004). “Third-party Punishment and Social Norms." Evolution and human behavior 25, no. 2. doi:10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4
- ABSTRACT: We examine the characteristics and relative strength of third-party sanctions in a series of experiments. We hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose economic payoff is unaffected by the norm violation, may be willing to enforce these norms although the enforcement is costly for them.
Almost two-thirds of the third parties indeed punished the violation of the distribution norm and their punishment increased the more the norm was violated. Likewise, up to roughly 60% of the third parties punished violations of the cooperation norm. Thus, our results show that the notion of strong reciprocity extends to the sanctioning behavior of “unaffected” third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that third-party punishment games are powerful tools for studying the characteristics and the content of social norms. Further experiments indicate that second parties, whose economic payoff is reduced by the norm violation, punish the violation much more strongly than do third parties.
2009
- (Henrich et al., 2010) ⇒ Joseph Henrich, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie Henrich, Carolyn Lesorogol, Frank Marlowe, David Tracer, and John Ziker. (2010). “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment.” In: Science, 327(5972) doi:10.1126/science.1182238