Unsolicited Bulk Communication

An Unsolicited Bulk Communication is a unsolicited communication that is a bulk communication.

• Context:
  • …
• Example(s):
  • a Cold Call.
  • an Unsoliciated Bulk (Spam) Email.
  • …
• Counter-Example(s):
  • a Webpage.
  • an Unsolicited Personal Communication.
  • a Solicited Bulk Communication, such as: subscriber newsletters, customer communications, discussion lists.
• See: Solicited Communication, Inappropriate Communication, Attention Market.

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References

2018

• https://www.spamhaus.org/consumer/definition/
  • QUOTE: Unsolicited means that the Recipient has not granted verifiable permission for the message to be sent. Bulk means that the message is sent as part of a larger collection of messages, all having substantively identical content.

    A message is Spam only if it is both Unsolicited and Bulk.

    • Unsolicited Email is normal email
      (examples: first contact enquiries, job enquiries, sales enquiries)
    • Bulk Email is normal email
      (examples: subscriber newsletters, customer communications, discussion lists)

2006

• (Loder et al., 2006) ⇒ Theodore Loder, Marshall Van Alstyne, and Rick Wash. (2006). “An Economic Response to Unsolicited Communication.” The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 6, no. 1
  • ABSTRACT: If communication involves some transactions cost to both sender and recipient, what policy ensures that correct messages -- those with positive social surplus –- get sent? Filters block messages that harm recipients but benefit senders by more than transactions costs. Taxes can block positive value messages, and allow harmful messages through. In contrast, we propose an ``Attention Bond, allowing recipients to define a price that senders must risk to deliver the initial message. The underlying problem is first-contact information asymmetry with negative externalities. Uninformed senders waste recipient attention through message pollution. Requiring attention bonds creates an attention market, effectively applying the Coase Theorem to price this scarce resource. In this market, screening mechanisms shift the burden of message classification from recipients to senders, who know message content. Price signals can also facilitate decentralized two-sided matching. In certain limited cases, this leads to greater welfare than use of even ``perfect filters.

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