Normative Reason

AKA: Justifying Reason.
Example(s):
- a Moral reason, such as: It is wrong to steal. It is right to help those in need.
- a Prudential reason, such as: It is wise to save for retirement. It is dangerous to drive drunk.
- a Just reason, such as: It is just to punish criminals. It is unjust to discriminate against people.
- a Aesthetic reason, such as: It is beautiful to listen to music. It is ugly to litter.
- …
Counter-Example(s):
- an Explanatory Reason.
See: Reasoning, Ought Fact, Epistemic Reason, Practical Reason.

References

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reason_%28argument%29#Normative_vs._explanatory_reasons
- Normative reasons (AKA justifying reasons) are often said to be "considerations which count in favor" of some state of affairs (this is, at any rate, a common view, notably held by T. M. Scanlon and Derek Parfit).^[1]^[2] ...

↑ Scanlon, T.M. What We Owe To Each Other. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1998. p. 17.
↑ Parfit, Derek (January 23, 2009) (PDF). On What Matters (forthcoming). Rutgers University. Archived from the original on March 31, 2010. http://web.archive.org/web/20100331074040/http://fas-philosophy.rutgers.edu/chang/Papers/OnWhatMatters1.pdf. Retrieved September 16, 2011.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reason_%28argument%29#Normative_reasons
- Some philosophers (one being John Broome^[1]) view normative reasons as the same as "explanations of ought facts". Just as explanatory reasons explain why some descriptive fact obtains (or came to obtain), normative reasons on this view explain why some normative facts obtain, i.e., they explain why some state of affairs ought to come to obtain (e.g., why someone should act or why some event ought to take place).

↑ Broome, John. “Reasons". In Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Edited by R. Jay Wallace et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 28.

(Raz, 2009) ⇒ Joseph Raz. (2009). “Reasons: Explanatory and Normative.” In: Constantine Sandis (ed.), "New Essays on the Explanation of Action."
- (intro to republication [1]) ‘A reason’ has two meanings: explanatory reasons are facts that contribute to an explanation (of anything explained); normative reasons are facts that favour and guide responses, in one’s emotions, beliefs, actions, etc., to how things are. The two kinds of reasons are connected by their connection to the capacity of Reason, or rationality, and by the normative/explanatory nexus, i.e. by the fact that normative reasons can explain the response that they favour. Normative reasons are — potentially — explanatory reasons, but the explanations they provide are of a special kind that presupposes their normative character. The chapter builds on ideas offered by B. Williams, and criticizes J. Broome’s view of the relations between reasons, explanations, and ‘ought-facts’, offering an alternative explanation of ought-propositions.